I was reminded today of Mencius as I read this op-ed piece in the NYT: "How Tyrants Endure".  

First a bit of background…

Mencius is associated with the concept of "right of rebellion:" if a ruler is behaving badly, then some people can justifiably remove that ruler from power.  Historically  debate has raged about whether this implies a generalized popular "right of rebellion," in which the "people" can and should rise up against a tyrant, or if Mencius simply means that a more restricted sector of society – the leading families, the aristocracy, the royal ministers, etc. – are the only ones who can and should rightfully act against a despot.  I tend to accept the latter, more restricted interpretation of Mencius, especially in light of Justin Tiwald's work.  

But beyond the justification for removing bad rulers from power, Mencius provides a somewhat more subtle and, perhaps, powerful assault against tyrannical abuses of power.  And we can see this when reflecting on the NYT piece.  Here is what the authors, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith say:

Despotic rulers stay in power by rewarding a small group of loyal supporters, often composed of key military officers, senior civil servants and family members or clansmen. A central responsibility of these loyalists is to suppress opposition to the regime. But they only carry out this messy, unpleasant task if they are well rewarded. Autocrats therefore need to ensure a continuing flow of benefits to their cronies.

If the dictator’s backers refuse to suppress mass uprisings or if they defect to a rival, then he is in real trouble. That is why successful autocrats reward their cronies first, and the people last. As long as their cronies are assured of reliable access to lavish benefits, protest will be severely suppressed. Once the masses suspect that crony loyalty is faltering, there is an opportunity for successful revolt. Three types of rulers are especially susceptible to desertion by their backers: new, decrepit and bankrupt leaders.

This sentence is especially important: "That is why successful autocrats reward their cronies first, and the people last."  It brings a rather famous passage from Mencius to mind:

Mencius said: "The people are the most precious of all things.  Next come the gods of soil and grain.  The sovereign matters least." (14.14/7B.14)

Indeed, throughout the book that bears his name, Mencius is constantly presented as challenging rulers to share their wealth with the people, to ensure that economic inequalities do not grow too onerous, and to limit their personal consumption, as well as that of their families and immediate political supporters, all in the interest in preserving "the most precious of all things."  We can read this as a kind of socio-economic welfarism but, as De Mesquita and Smith suggest, it also has profound political implications.  If taken seriously, and actually implemented, serving the people would limit an autocrats capacity to pay off the military, the bureaucracy and other key political supporters.  From the Menican point of view, a ruler has to be willing to weaken his own political base, in order to create the conditions for longer term political stability, on the belief that when people can see that their material conditions are improving they will continue to support the leader who has contributed to their prosperity.

The Mencian call for the people to come first, therefore, is a direct challenge to the typical, short-term political strategy of authoritarians.

The recent Jasmine Revolution that has swept across North Africa and the Middle East bears Mencius out.  Mubarak and Gaddafi and Asad and others had not placed the people first. Their political strategies, as De Mesquita and Smith argue, focused on directing scarce economic resources to their political cronies.  This worked for a while, a fairly long while in many cases.  But, in the end, especially as resources became more and more scarce due to global recession, the people became desperate enough to protest and, just as importantly, the old cronies grew skeptical that the autocrats could continue to pay them off.  Et Voila!  The dictators faced political crisis. 

Had these rulers read Mencius, perhaps they would have come to understand that paying off cronies in the short term is not only unjust, but also a recipe for political failure in the longer term.

This is not a "right of rebellion" argument.  Rather, it is a warning to dictators: if you do not let go of your own personal political interest in maintaining power, if you insist upon diverting scarce resources to political supporters, you will ultimately face ignominy.  In ruling, if the interests of the sovereign are placed first, the regime will be unstable and liable to crisis and breakdown.