The Useless Tree

Mencius on Torture

Commenter Steve GW asks some good questions in reference to my post below on Sun Tzu's stance against torture (which is basically consequentialist):

Are
there, in fact, any arguments against torture in Chinese philosophy
that aren't basically utilitarian? If there aren't, then could there
have been? In Western philosophy our arguments are usually from appeal
to various notions of 'human rights', but that wouldn't be possible for
the Chinese sages. Other arguments are from the harm done to the
character of the torturers: i.e. you don't want to be the sort of
person who does that, so it's morally impermissible for you to do so.
Is it possible to run such an argument in the Chinese context? Has it
ever been done?

The answer is, yes, there are resources in ancient Chinese philosophy for an anti-torture argument.  And the first place I will look is in Mencius.

Torture is not mentioned explicitly in Mencius, but the book is well known for its general position against warfare and killing.  Not all warfare and killing are justified but there are certain circumstances that might yield justifiable war and killing, circumstances associated with violations of Humane governance.

It is, however, the latter point made by SteveGW which is most apt.  I think it is clear that Mencius would agree that we should not torture others because it would harm the character of the torturer.  In Confucian terms, a noble-minded person would not torture.  And since Confucianism wants to expand noble-mindedness to as many people as possible, there would be a general Confucian aversion to torture.

A couple of passages from Mencius come to mind here.   Here's this from 3.6 (2A.6):

Mencius said: "Everyone has a heart that can't bear to see others suffer.  The ancient emperors had hearts the couldn't bear to see others suffer, and so had governments the couldn't bear to see others suffer.  If you lead a government that can't bear to see others suffer, ruling all beneath Heaven is like turning it in the palm of your hand.

This is part of the famous Mencian view that human nature is inherently good.  To be true to ourselves, to be noble-minded and work toward Humanity by fulfilling Duty according to Ritual, we must allow our innate goodness to be expressed in all of our actions towards others.  There is a consequentialist aspect to this – when our actions are morally correct, we will exercise a certain morally charismatic power over others and goverment will be effective and just – but it is not primarily consequentialist.  We do not do good in order to govern well; rather we do good because doing so is in keeping with our inherent human nature and the natural love we feel for those closest to us.  Doing bad distorts us.  Good government is a secondary effect of performing one's primary duties to family and friends and acquaintances. 

It is safe to say (regardless of the twisted logic of the Bush torture memos) that torture inflicts suffering.  The noble-minded, who conscientiously cultivate their appetite for Duty and Humanity, are obviously most repelled at the thought of the suffering of others.  Thus, the noble-minded would not take up torture themselves,.  And they would advise anyone else to avoid it so as to not distort Humanity.  To those who would comtemplate torture, Mencius might say (11.14; 6A.14):

We each contain percious and worthless, great and small.  Never injure the great for the sake of the small, or the precious for the sake of the worthless.  Small people nurture what is small in them; great people nurtuer what is great in them.

Inflicting pain and suffering on others is obviously "small" and "worthless."  Those who do so are "small people," morally underdeveloped.  Mencius wants us all to aspire to be "great people;" we can all be like Shun and Yao.  We just have to do the right thing.  And torture is not the right thing.

And to those who might say that torture might be permissable some time, for some sorts of reasons, Mencius might reply (13.17; 7A.17):

Mencius said: "Don't do what should not be done, and don't desire what should not be desired.  Abide by this one precept, and everything else will follow."


There are some things that should obviously not be done, like inflicting pain on others, which goes so fundamentally against our human instincts.  Just don't do it, he is saying.  This would be something like a Mencian "shock the conscience" test.

I could go on, but have to leave off there for now.  Long story short: there is a Confucian argument against torture.  And I think there is a Daoist one as well, but that will have to wait for another day….

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2 responses to “Mencius on Torture”

  1. CP Avatar
    CP

    I think these issues turn (sometimes, I think there are other ways to point to non-utilitarian claims in Confucius) on questions of moral priority. Confucius (and Mencius) are clearly oriented towards alleviating suffering. But the question is: why? It could be that pain is a state of affairs that is intrinsically bad, and from there you define motivations/dispositions focused on increasing it (or at least insensitive to it) as morally deficient. Likewise, the reverse would be morally admirable. From this picture, you get a utilitarianism that uses virtues/vices.
    But the story can run another way too. It could be that certain dispositions/motivations are morally admirable from the start (say the motivation to decrease suffering, or increase its opposite), and then argue that the object of those virtues (the states of decreased pain) are good. In this case, you have what seems more properly understood to be a virtue ethic, one that has utiltiarian-like goods as (at least partly) its objects/aims.
    At least that’s one way to do it, I suppose. There are others too, I think.

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  2. SteveGW Avatar
    SteveGW

    Thanks for the thoughtful responses; they’re much appreciated.
    I think the arguments that you give are likely to be the sort that a Confucian sage would give on this topic if he wanted to argue against torture, and I think you’re right that he would have a preference for not torturing, but I doubt that that preference could be extended to a blanket prohibition against torture – at least, not on the grounds you give. Your proposed argument appeals to the limits placed on a man’s possible behaviours by his ren, and no-one doubts that there are such limits, but I think that even fully-developed ren cannot play the role that you want it to play of erecting impassable barriers against some forms of behaviour.
    It’s reasonable enough to suppose that on the Mencian understanding of human nature, torture would offend against the compassionate element of human nature that allows us to feel empathy (for the child in the well, for example.) Also, it is right and proper to nurture this aspect of our human nature, for it is the seed that grows into ren (“The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence” (2A.6)) and ren is one of the virtues. Now, Mencius wants us to develop this ren as far as we can, to make us noble, from which it follows that the truly noble man is one who is truly compassionate; but your claim would then be that no truly compassionate person could bring themselves to cause pain to another, and that therefore torture would be effectively absolutely prohibited. This, I think, does not follow.
    Ren cannot be just free-floating compassion. To be a virtue it has to be expressed according to the li. If there are cases where, according to the li, the appropriate way to show ren involves causing some pain or even killing, then it couldn’t be the Mencian position that causing pain was never the right thing to do; and that opens the door to a possible justification for torture in some cases. So the question now is, do the li ever call for such a thing? I think that, given the widespread acceptance of punishment in Chinese society, we’d have to say that the traditions did encompass the inflicting of pain as part of the pattern of behaviours that contributes to a harmonious society. Those traditions are the li.
    So I don’t think that “Don’t do what should not be done, and don’t desire what should not be desired” is going to give us the blanket prohibition that you suggest, because it leaves it up to an interpretation of the li what it actually is that should or should not be done, and the li may well allow us (or demand of us) that we inflict pain.
    One way (the only way that I can think of offhand) to deny that this mediation of ren through li has the consequence I am suggesting, would be to claim that the only cases in which inflicting pain was according to the li involved it being inflicted by a superior upon an inferior, and that Mencius thought that the noble character aspired to treat all men as social equals. All relations then would be relations like friendship – and in no circumstances is it proper for a friend to cause pain to a friend. But could such a claim be supported? I doubt it; because it would mean that Mencius had taken up the position of the Mohists, and he was pretty clear elsewhere (e.g. 3B.9) that Mohism was wrong on just this point.
    There’s one other thing that might be relevant. This conversation started with a consideration of the proper treatment of prisioners of war; but what is their place in the Confucian division of society? Which one of the five fundamental relationships covers the captive enemy soldier and his captor. I would guess that it would be the sovereign-subject relationship, but I don’t know. If the relationship was not covered at all, or not recognised in the li, then the Confucian would have no guidelines at all as to the proper behaviour.

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