Samuel Huntington died on Christmas Eve. He was a fairly famous academic, best known, in the past decade or so, for his "clash of civilizations" idea. For someone of my age, however, there were other, perhaps more important books. His, Political Order in Changing Societies was an important book for those of us who do comparative politics. It may have suffered from something like physics envy, in its attempt to reduce very complex historical processes to rather simplistic formula, but it stimulated a lot of discussion and ideas. Whether one agreed with him or not, all had to engage his arguments – and that is about the greatest accolade for any academic.
But I want to speak to something that always bothered me about the "clash of civilizations". Jeremiah has a personal critique; mine is more general.
In trying to delineate major cultural divisions in the world, Huntington identifies a "Sinic" civilization, which encompasses China, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. It does not include Japan. Indeed, Japan, for Huntington, is a civilization unto itself. This strikes me as absurd. Culturally, there are long standing and deep historical interactions among China, Korea and Japan. If by "civilization" we mean some combination of religious and philosophical and aesthetic ideas and practices (i.e. some general notion of "culture"), then it is very hard to see how Japan would fall outside the "sinic" zone.
What sets Japan apart from China is not so much culture as it is politics. The Meiji Restoration was a key turning point in the modern disjunction between China and Japan. And I would argue that the key reason why Japan was able to transform so quickly in the face of imperialist pressue (as my students are tired of hearing me say) was its internal political structure, a combination of fragmented military power (with each domain having the prerogative of maintaining its own forces) and centralized political authority (which meant that if the Shogunate could be overthrown a new national project could be undertaken from the center outward). China's more thoroughgoing political centralization (held together critically by the examination system and the bureaucracy) proved much more resistant to fundamental change. Japan changed and modernized faster than China, not because of some civilizational or cultural difference, but because of some very basic political institutional differences.
If that is the case, then Huntington's "civilizations," at least as they relate to Asia, appear to be based more on politics than culture. And that would seem to undermine his general proposition that a kind of vague cultural affinity will shape international politics. In other words, it is not culture that shapes politics, as he wants us to believe, but politics that shapes politics.
That is not to say that culture is meaningless. Rather, however influential Huntington's ideas, his notion of "civilization" is just too vague to explain the difference between China and Japan. And if you can't explain that difference, you can't say very much about East Asia.
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