(Cross posted on China Digital Times)

Before I jump into today’s topic – caste and democracy – let me just note two newspaper stories that
speak to my last China/India comparison. They both deal with the changing role of women in Indian society, which
is, to my mind, a critical social dynamic in the interplay of tradition and
modernity in India:
one in the New York Times and the other in the Washington Post. A nice coincidence to see them.

Now, to the issue at hand: a clear difference between India and China is the historical experience
and persistence of caste in the former, something that was palpable in my
recent travels.

As we moved about from place to place, our main tour guide
was quite straightforward and unapologetic about mentioning the caste status of
other people we met. He himself was from
a prominent Ksatriya (warrior and/or ruler) family, or, more specifically,
a Rajput. One of our local guides was Vaisya (merchant,
artisan), which he stated was the “number two” caste after the Brahmin (which
would be disputed by Ksatriya but which also demonstrates the fluidity of caste
hierarchy). We also noticed the
matrimonial sections of the newspapers, pages dedicated to young people in
search of marriage partners. These
services were organized by caste – there would be a section of “Brahmin,” then
“Agrawal,” etc. Some announcements said
that caste was no bar to a match but the clear sense of the entire operation
was that caste mattered very much for many, many people. The message was: you do not want your
children (most marriages in many parts of the country are arranged by parents
or senior family members) to marry someone from the “wrong” caste.

Nothing like this exists in China. But the question that this difference raises
is: does it matter? Or, how does it
matter?

It obviously matters when it comes to marriage. In the social sphere more generally – who
your friends are, how status is defined and reproduced, what is understood as
popular – caste plays a significant role. I suspect it matters more for Dalits, out castes, and others at the
bottom of the social hierarchy. They are
excluded socially from high caste lives, even if their rights are guaranteed in
the constitution and their political interests defended in the political
process. But, in India, the
social sphere is not wholly governed by political practices. Caste lives on despite political, and
increasingly economic, forces that push against it.

 Historically, the contrast with China is again notable. The Chinese imperial state very much shaped
social and cultural life, especially through the examination system for access
to bureaucratic office which created a cultural hegemony, of sorts, of
Confucian learning. There was a certain
homogeneity at the elite level that was forged by the recruitment practices of
the centralized state. India, by
contrast, never had the kind of political centralization that the Chinese
empire achieved, even under the Mughals, and thus never created a similar kind
of cultural homogeneity at the elite level of Hindu society (Muslim political
society was obviously more centered around Islam). India,
then, has always been more diverse and complex, socially and politically, than China.

For me, the bigger question is how caste matters in politics. 

As I think about the interplay of caste and democracy, I am
led to a counterintuitive conclusion: while caste obviously violates core the democratic
ideal of equal rights, it may have played a critical role in the successful
consolidation of Indian democracy. 

To explain: the Indian independence movement was, at base,
politically conservative. It was not
aimed at fundamental transformation of Indian society but, rather, the removal
of foreign power. Gandhi was a political
genius in forging a mass-based nationalist movement that promised participation
for all levels of Indian society, Dalits included. But when independence was gained, Nehru and
other Congress leaders kept their eye on national modernization, not radical
egalitarian promises. They were
thoroughly democratic in their politics and outlook, as opposed to the Leninists in the Chinese Communist Party, but their brand of democracy was
procedural and conservative, allowing high caste power-brokers to maintain
their social and economic standing in the new order. Caste was rejected in the constitution but
was hard-wired into the political system. Christophe Jaffrelot, in the new book The State of India’s Democracy, explains:

“The Congress leaders came mostly from the intelligentsia…whose
caste backgrounds drew generally from the literati castes, which includes
Kayasths and, more importantly, Brahmins…These politicians had established
close working relationships with traders and industrialists even before
independence…These groups were allies against the British and remained allies
after 1947…Similarly, Congress politicians initiated some collaboration with
the landlords…when they understood that they needed the landlords in order to
win elections. These landlords still
exerted a strong influence over the peasants, not only because they were their
bosses, but also because they lent them money on a regular basis. The authority of these elite groups derived
from their socioeconomic domination and from their social status: they were all
of the upper castes and therefore commanded symbolic power…” (67-68)

 He goes on to point out: “In this framework, the government
depended upon these [upper caste rural] notables to a large extent. As a result the socialist discourse of Nehru
could not be taken to its logical conclusion. Land reform, for instance, was never really enforced in order not to
alienate the rural big men who supported the Congress party.” (68)

The conservative nature of early Indian democracy (things
have been changing since the 1980’s with the broader empowerment of low caste
people) might help explain why democratization was able to consolidate
there. In socio-economic terms, Indian
democracy is an anomaly. Broad
cross-national studies suggest that success in democratization (not the actual
initiation of democratic transition but its likelihood of succeeding over time
and consolidating) requires a level of economic development higher than India’s. From this perspective, Indian democracy
should have failed. But it has persisted,
even through the Emergency of Indira Gandhi.

 It may be that democracy has succeeded in India precisely
because of its conservatism early on. Power brokers and privileged high caste people bought into the
democratic system from the outset because they believed their interests would
not be fundamentally challenged by it. They were willing to work through the new democratic system, and thus
contribute to its consolidation, because they were secure in their power and
prospects. This may have been bad for
lower levels of society – land reform was not pressed as far as it should have
been, and thus poverty has persisted – but it has been good in terms of
maintaining certain freedoms and avoiding horrific man-made disasters like China’s Great
Leap famine, which Amartya Sen argues was caused, broadly, by a lack of
democracy.

This may be an unsatisfying idea for those who want to
understand democracy as more egalitarian and potentially transformative. But when we think about actually existing
democracies around the world, we can see that many of the most successful (if
by “successful” we mean not being overthrown by authoritarian power and
maintaining a certain level of civil and political rights) democracies, we will
notice the inherent conservatism of their politics. That is not to say that all democracies will
always remain conservative and resist fundamental social change; rather, such
change will come gradually, only as the anxieties of power-holders are counterbalanced
by newly mobilized political forces, a process that takes time. 

There may be a lesson here for China and the prospects for democracy
there. 

India, in
the first instance, reminds us that democracy could be possible in China. The argument that China is too undeveloped
economically and socially is obviously insufficient, an apology of Party bosses
who do not want to yield power. Especially these days, with an expanding economy and dynamic society
with high rates of literacy, it is hard to accept a socio-economic denial of
Chinese democracy.

But India might also suggest that if China were to democratize (and I’m not holding my breath), consolidation and long
term success would depend upon the cooperation and participation of current power-holders. In the Chinese case, that means party
leaders; they would have to buy into whatever process of democratization that
unfolds and they would have to feel that they could, for some time at least,
maintain their power and status under conditions of democratization, just like
high caste Indians in the first several decades of Indian democracy. If a more adversarial or contentious process
were to develop, one in which party leaders felt threatened and endangered,
their resistance could derail democratization.

That, at any rate, could be an Indian lesson for Chinese
democratization.