I have fallen a bit behind in posting.  Yesterday, the combination of my class schedule (I had one regular class and then two tutorial sessions back to back to back) and some family issues (my aunt is back in the nursing home for some physical therapy) kept me from the blog.  And then I skipped town.  I just finished watching the sun set over the Pacific Ocean from the window of my hotel room in sunny and warm LA.

    I am here to give a talk – actually I will give the same talk twice – on political change in China to a group, a fairly large group, of alumni from Williams College.  There are several other faculty members here with me to give other talks.  It will be quite a circus of academic performance!  It all lasts one day, tomorrow, but should be pleasantly intense. 

     Here are some of the thoughts I will toss out tomorrow. 

     China has obviously changed a great deal in the past 25 years.  But Chinese politics still remains repressive and authoritarian.  There is little prospect for something like democratization any time soon (I am not expecting it, at least), but that does not mean that politics is not changing, and perhaps in important ways.

     I will suggest three categories to analyze political change in China:

     1) Institutions – this has changed the least.  The CCP is still very much in power; it dominates recruitment and promotion of virtually all significant political actors.  It does not tolerate political organization, even on a the most modest levels of civil society.  And it is resistant to change.  Indeed, as Minxin Pei argues (I assigned this article of his for my "classes" tomorrow), partial economic reform has created a neo-Leninist amalgam of party-state apparatus and economic entities (State owned enterprises, etc.) that is even more resistant to change, because party members use their positions to reap wealth from the country’s economic growth, than might have been the case in, say, 1980.   

    2) Consciousness/Identity – I draw this idea from Merle Goldman’s book, From Comrade to Citizen (I gave tomorrow’s "students" a chapter from this as well) where she discusses the rise of "rights consciousness" in recent years.  She is not pollyannish; she recognizes the institutional obstacles that prevent the realization of political and civil rights. But she documents the ways in which more and more people are claiming their rights, and this is a significant change.  People conceive of themselves politically as individuals who have a certain standing and capacity.

    3) Practice/Behavior – by this I mean what people do, in their daily routines and in their political actions.  In recent years there has been an increase in protest behavior, people acting upon their new found rights consciousness.  There is also a great deal of popular cultural behavior that expresses individuality

      So, the question for tomorrow, and maybe for any of you who want to chime in here, is: can the institutional stasis continue to limit the growth of rights consciousness and the increase in individualizing political and cultural behavior that presses against regime restrictions?

     There will be a quiz…

Sam Crane Avatar

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2 responses to “LA”

  1. Jeremiah Avatar

    I’ve written this in other places, but I do see the CCP adapting, somewhat, to the realities of China’s economic growth and development. The problem, often, is a disconnect between center and local. For example, the CCP has some of the best enviornmental protection laws of any country, but getting local officials to step away from the hog trough of kickbacks and investment has been tricky to say the least. As Minxin Pei has argued, there are now strong financial incentives for cadres to preserve the status-quo. Part of this is systemic: performance of local officials is often measured based on the economic performance of their district and protecting the legitimacy of the party often takes priority in deciding court cases.
    How to fix this? I’ve said before, and I still believe, that a combination of a judicial system fully independent of party supervision and a free media might actually help the central government. Freeing up the courts and media would allow the people to sue for protections already in place and for greater transparency in the relationship between local officials and business interests. The question of course is whether the CCP has the political courage to do this or whether they fear trodding onto a slippery slope. A farmer that could sue the local factory for damages might also wish to sue the local party boss who approved the factory. The newspaper who publishes stories about a local mayor being on the take might then want to write about how the governor got a cut as well.
    It is not unlike the first decade of the 20th century. After the Boxer debacle, the Qing court instituted a series of military, education, and political reforms. These reforms were designed to save the dynasty by preserving the legitimacy of the court and providing an outlet for growing political pressure from below. Ultimately however, new institutions created under these reforms–New Army Units, provincial assemblies–ended up playing key roles in the eventual dissolution of the dynasty in 1911. The CCP does not want to make Cixi’s mistake.

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  2. Sam Avatar

    Jeremiah,
    This is quite helpful. I am sure that someone in Zhongnanhai invokes the Qing case when discussions of political reform come up, for precisely the kinds of reasons you suggest. But your focus on judicial and press reform do seem to be the key. The party will not permit direct political challenge, but they publicly champion the idea of the “rule of law.” They also say they want to root out corruption. If they really believe in these things (and some might), the further development of the legal profession and the judicial system should be possible. The case of Gao Yaojie suggests as much. Provincial and lower level cadres wanted to suppress her, but she is doing exactly what the higher level leaders say they want. Now, if they could only see the light with Chen Guangcheng, things might really start to improve…

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