As should be readily apparent, I have been following, in the past couple of years, the resurgence of Confucianism in China.  One of the aspects that is most interesting to me is the way in which the once-criticized philosophy has been embraced by political leaders searching for a new basis of legitimacy for the authoritarian state.  I do not believe that Confucianism is a singular ideology that simply rationalizes centralized power – though it has been used in that manner for long stretches of Chinese history – but, rather it is a wide field of interpretive possibilities that holds within it suggestions for how to live a good life as well as a powerful critique of tyranny.

     Yesterday, as part of the research I am doing for a conference paper on Confucianism in a postmodern context, I had the pleasure of reading Yingjie Guo’s book, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity Under Reform.  His chapter, "Reconstructing a Confucian nation: The Confucian revival," is really very helpful in understanding just how far the return of the philosophy has gone.

    Guo makes clear that the state needs Confucianism as at least a part of a new cultural nationalism that will bolster social unity in the face of the extraordinarily destabilizing economic and societal transformations unleashed by reform.  But he also shows how threatening the Confucian revival is for the Communist Party.  What is most evident in this chapter is the extent to which Confucian intellectuals, most notably the group he refers to as the "New Confucians," fundamentally reject the most basic ideological underpinnings of historical materialism (you know, the most elemental of Marxist understandings) and how openly and widely they have made their arguments in the past twenty years.  The Party is playing a dangerous game: tolerating, even encouraging, the return of a philosophy that, in certain forms, is absolutely incompatible with communism and socialism.

     I come away from the chapter with a greater appreciation for the struggle over contemporary Chinese national identity.  If Confucianism catches on more widely (and it is not clear to me that it will), will that require a more explicit public renunciation of Marxism within the narrative of the modern Chinese nation?  Or is there room for some sort of Confucian-Marxist compromise?  My initial impulse is to believe that compromise in any but the most facile ways is not really possible. 

      It was with these thoughts in mind that I read this op-ed in today’s People’s Daily: "Chinese enjoy renewed pride in their identity," by Hong Kong political official, Lau Nai-keung.   It’s an odd piece in that it mentions neither Marx nor Confucius.  It harps on the standard "century of humiliation" but elides the horrors of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution and focuses on the pride Chinese people can now take in their economic success.

     What is most odd however, is the lack of clarity on what, precisely, the new Chinese identity is:

At one time, many Chinese people worshipped Western culture as a symbol
of modernity. We now have a renewed confidence in our own cultural
identity, but remain firmly committed to the cause of modernization.

 So, it is a "modern" identity but not Western.  Making that distinction concrete is where the problem (the silliness?) comes in:

…we gradually establish our own perspectives, a healthy,
open and balanced one. We can now face any country in the world as
equals, and more importantly, we can also face our ancestors and look
at them straight in the eye. There is in fact nothing wrong with
Chinese culture. Like any other culture on the planet, it grew out of
necessity and habit handed down from one generation to another. Like it
or not, we are being surrounded and moulded by our culture, and there
is no way we can cut ourselves off from it.

With that also comes the realization that the blind
Westernization of the recent past has done us great damage. The
adoption of a high-protein diet has resulted, just like what is
happening in the West, in a high incidence of obesity, hypertension,
diabetes and cancer. The emulation of an automobile society is now
bringing us havoc and pollution. We have determined to find our own
way, taking reference from experience around the world.

 So… too much beef and too many cars are "Western" and China will find a distinctive "modern" expression, presumably without these Western contaminants?  I am willing to bet right now that, twenty five years in the future, Chinese consumption of high-protein foods and its automobile use will in no way distinguish it from the US.

    For me, this illustrates the difficulties faced by Chinese cultural nationalists today (or any cultural nationalists anywhere today).  The deepening and broadening of modernization through globalization makes it very difficult to sustain a consistent cultural differentiation between one place and another.  I am fairly certain that up and coming  Chinese yuppies in Shanghai have more in common, culturally, with their American peers in New York than with poor peasants in the mountains of Yunnan. 

     On the other hand, if cultural nationalists want to reach into the past and resuscitate Confucianism in their efforts to distinguish what is truly "Chinese" from what is "Western," as Guo’s chapter reminds us, they are going to run into the contradictions that the realities of globalized modernity pose for a pre-modern philosophy.  I think it is safe to say that Confucius would be repelled by the growing individualism and conspicuous consumption of everyday Chinese urban life.  And those features of the new China are too powerfully established to be turned aside by a revived Confucianism.

    In the end, cultural nationalists and Confucians will just have to accept more modest goals: not a uniquely non-Western Chinese identity, but a small addition to the global mix of cultural resources.