It is clear now (again?) that the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea has failed. 

     Pyongyang’s July 4th missile launches were a product of the ineffective tough-guy stance Bush has assumed since taking office in 2001.  Remember, one of the first things he did upon coming into office was turn his back on an emergent agreement to limit missile testing that was negotiated by the Clinton people.  Bush was more concerned about demonstrating that he was not Clinton than he was interested in doing the hard work of restraining North Korean military power.

    And then it got worse.  The "axis of evil" rhetoric only made it harder to engage Kim Jong-il.  Do you really want to get into a war of words with the rhetorical nut cases north of the border?  And then the invasion of Iraq only increased the incentive for North Korea to produce more nukes and develop its missiles: they could reasonably assume that once we had taken Baghdad, they were next up.

     So, here we are, six years later, with no progress on North Korea policy.  The good news, of course, is that there has also been little to no progress on North Korea’s part in developing their missile technology.  The long-range rocket failed; all they have really accomplished, besides whipping up conservative calls for an air strike, is to demonstrate to the world that they cannot attack the US.

     I have long agreed with those who understand North Korea as a fundamentally weak, failed state.  Kim and company do not pose a serious threat to the US.  They are most likely obsessed with regime survival and are, thus, deterrable.  And their disastrous economy gives them little material basis upon which to create a high-tech military capability: they have nothing to trade (except hollow threats) and almost nothing to feed their people. 

      In light of the prolonged inability of the Bush administration to find a way to change the strategic context surrounding North Korea (we keep playing the same game over and over), I think it is time for a jujitsu foreign policy maneuver, a complete turn about in US policy that will both catch Pyongyang off guard and, perhaps, begin to create new conditions on the ground.  And we can start with a line from the Tao Te Ching:

A great nation that puts itself below a small nation
takes over the small nation,
and a small nation that puts itself below a great nation
gives itself over to the great nation.

                        Passage 61

     This is in keeping with the general Taoist notion of "in yielding there is completion;" that is, the idea that working along with natural surroundings, not pushing directly against the obstacles one may encounter but flowing around them, is the best way to move forward.

    Applying this idea to North Korea: the US is the "great nation" and NK is the "small nation."  Now, obviously, NK is not "putting itself below" the great nation.  It is pushing back and trying to force itself onto the international agenda.  The TTJ would suggest that this sort of assertiveness is bound to fail: it does not address the underlying weaknesses of the NK economy and society.  If Kim were smart (which he appears not to be) and was truly interested in maximizing national power, he would follow the Chinese lead: open up the the world economy, accept interdependencies, and reap significant national benefits.

    But even if the small country resists subordination to the "great nation" that does not mean that the "great nation" cannot and should not "put itself below" the small nation.  In this case, the US, instead of confronting and trying, unsuccessfully, to dominate NK, should reverse course and give it everything it wants.  What does Kim want?  Written and diplomatically performed "security guarantees" from the US; access to Western money and technology; and, I bet, he would even like help with his country’s food problems.  OK.  Let’s give to him.  Give it all to him.

     Just think how stunning it would be if Bush announced tomorrow that he was sending Condi to Pyongyang with written security guarantees and an opening dialogue on linking NK to the world economy?  What could Kim say?  Of course, he would declare victory and tell the world how he single-handedly defeated American imperialism.  But if it started a process of drawing NK into the webs of globalization, he would almost certainly be signing on to the beginning of the end of NK as we know it. 

     If we have learned anything from China in the past twenty-five years, it is that markets, when allowed into decrepit socialist systems, are far more effective at social and political (yes, I understand the limits of political change in China) transformation than military threats ever were.  I know: Chinese socio-economic transformation has also underwritten its military development.  China, objectively, is a greater potential threat to the US now than it has ever been.  But it is also true that, outside of Taiwan (which is very, very important), China’s immersion into world markets has also created cross-cutting interests that make it less likely to use its increased military power.

    Yes, there is one large drawback in killing NK with kindness: it could be seen as rewarding bad behavior.  If we give Kim everything he wants, then every petty dictator will start to build a nuclear missile in the hope of getting the same deal.  Maybe.  But I don’t believe this will be a major problem.  What national leader is really going to want to try to follow NK’s suit?  And in what situation will the current nuclear powers tolerate proliferation? (One of the key elements of the NK situation is China’s hesitancy, for its own interests, to press Pyongyang).  Iran?  Fine; let’s do the same thing with them.  Alternatively, the past six years of Bush tough-guy posturing have not stopped NK, and could be interpreted by other states to demonstrate that the best way to deal with the US is to build some nukes and tests some missiles.   

    It would be better to change the terms of engagement and create new incentives for marginalized regimes to open themselves up to the moderating influences of globalization.