There is a lot of talk these days about how the "surge" in Iraq has worked and that "victory" is at hand.  Rubbish.  While it is true that the "surge" was one of several elements (the others being internal Iraqi political shifts beyond the control of US policy) that contributed to a reduction in violence, it has not produced a political settlement.  And without a political settlement, Iraq remains a lost war.

    I was reminded of Bush's fundamental failure in Iraq when I heard this morning of the flight of Iraqi Christians from Mosul. From yesterday's NYT:

Violence has continued in the area despite months of concerted effort
by American forces and the Iraqi government to root out violent actors
there.

     I've noticed more reports of violence in recent weeks.  It is not at all clear that the reduction in the number of attacks associated with the "surge" will last.  

    My friend, Abu Aardvark, tells us that political reconciliation has not yet occurred and is likely not to occur until US forces are drawn down:

The problem lies in the fundamentally flawed belief that providing
more security is the key to achieving political compromise. Restoring
basic levels of security from the low point of 2006 was indeed
essential. But now, contrary to what the authors argue, improved
security is making the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
less likely to make meaningful compromises, since Maliki currently sees
little downside to not doing so. The Iraqi government simply does not
share American assessments of the negative consequences that would
result from failing to achieve reconciliation. And as long as the U.S.
military protects Iraqi leaders from
the consequences of their choices, they are probably correct.

    The "authors" to which he refers include Stephen Biddle, who gave a talk here last week.  It was well informed and insightful but, ultimately, untimely.  His bottom line is that US forces must stay at least two more years, and perhaps longer, in order to assure political accord.  Abu Aardvark is arguing the opposite – Iraqi political actors have no real incentive to come to political terms with one another until they know they must bear responsibility for their own security upon the removal of US troops – and I agree with him.  We have had too many promises, too many disruptions and crises, to trust that the various Iraqi factions.  They now have the economic means to support themselves; let them do so.

    Indeed, listening to Biddle, I couldn't help but think: "this is a great talk….for 2004 or so."  Americans have moved beyond the war.  I cannot imagine much political support for an open-ended commitment, or even for a presence of two more years with no guarantee of withdrawal.  And when we add in the inevitable domestic effects of the current economic crisis, most Americans will oppose spending money on the Iraq war.  It's just too late for all that.

    To put it in Sun Tzu terms, whoever is the next president – which seems most likely to be Obama – he will face a domestic political situation in which pursuing war in Iraq will be out of keeping with the Way (Tao), the very first of Sun Tzu's "fundamental factors" of warfare.

By moral influence (tao) I mean that which causes people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril. 1.4

     Iraq, it is safe to say, is not in the American Way.  

     Bush lost the war.