My friend, Abu Aardvark, has an excellent post on the problems of the Iraq war.  The bottom line:

Tactics working against strategy – that’s been the concern I’ve been
expressing for many months now. I haven’t been reassured.  Instead of
getting sucked into debates over body counts, or clutching at whatever
good or bad news crosses the headlines each morning, the national
debate should be looking at the big picture.  It isn’t about how we are
doing day to day – what are we trying to achieve?

     All of the talk about the apparent decrease in violence in parts of the country, which Bush supporters tout as evidence that the "surge" is working, are largely meaningless in the larger scheme of things.  Tactical moves only make sense if they are coordinated and focused on strategic ends – and that is what is missing in the American war: it is not clear what the ultimate goal is or should be.  The tired recitation of a unified, democratic Iraq is simply impossible.  At some level everyone knows this.  But US tactics, as Marc shows, are actively pushing against this.  We are, in effect, producing a fragmentation of sovereignty (if such a weighty word can be used here) and authority.  But is that what the US really wants?  To get all realist about it: how does a collection of warlord satraps serve US interests?

      And that is where Sun Tzu comes in.  Remember what he has to say about war-fighting:

Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy;

Next best is to disrupt his alliances;

The next best is to attack his army.

The worst policy is to attack cities.  Attack cities only when there is no alternative. (chapter 3)

      He is urging us not only to think strategically but to think in a strategically contextual manner, shaping our goals in relation to the enemy’s goals.  This requires both a clear sense of what our goals should be (which is what is missing from US policy now) and an understanding of what our adversary’s goals are.  In Iraq this is made much more complex by the multiplicity of adversaries: there are many and each has its own particular interests.  Of course, the real problem has been the lack of clear US strategy up until this point, a failure that has produced the current strategic complexity.  Now, it is likely too late.  Whatever we do, one or another adversary will benefit.  The game is too complicated for us to account for and attack the strategies of all of the "enemies".   All that Bush and company does is fulminate against the most likely strategic winner, whose victory his failed policy has produced: Iran.

     Bush’s war is mired in worst and near-worst Sun Tzu conditions: attacking cities and armies.  The US has lost the chance to effectively attack the enemies’ strategies or alliances.

      Bush lost the war.