Fred Kaplan has an article in yesterday’s NYT Sunday Magazine, "Challenging the Generals," which follows up on the critique of US military leadership in Iraq put forward by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling. 

     The problem, it seems to me, is a failure of strategic vision.   Or, alternatively, a failure of creativity in linking tactics to strategy.  All of which is exacerbated by a failure of responsibility.  The war in Iraq has obviously gone badly for the US, especially from a strategic point of view.  But virtually no one has been held accountable, no one has been demoted or lost their job for the strategic flaws of US military operations.  In fact, the people who have been punished, and I am thinking especially of General Shinseki, are the ones who had the correct analysis at the outset.

      And this brings me to Sun Tzu.  He has much to say about military leadership, but I offer here a few points that seem especially relevant in light of Kaplan’s and Yingling’s arguments.

      At the very start of The Art of War, Sun Tzu identifies "command" as one of the five "fundamental factors:"

By command I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness. (1.7)

      Which is then explicated by the commentator Tu Mu:

…If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently.  If sincere, his men will have no doubt of the certainty of rewards and punishments.  If humane, he loves mankind, sympathizes with others, and appreciates their industry and toil.  If courageous, he gains victory by seizing opportunity without hesitation.  If strict, his troops are disciplined because they are in awe of him and afraid of punishment.

     The American inability to adapt flexibly to the changing battlefield of Iraq suggests failures of, in Sun Tzu’s terms, wisdom and courage.  The latter might seem a bit harsh – there are certainly many acts of individual courage performed everyday by American military people in Iraq.  But Sun Tzu here seems to be invoking another sort of courage, the courage to act quickly in the face of changing circumstances, something that the bureaucratic behemoth that is the US military seems unable to do.  As Kaplan suggest, perhaps more courage could also be demonstrated by general officers in telling political leaders the truth, especially about the real numbers of troops it would take to occupy Iraq or the real effects the war is having on US military power more generally.

      Also, Kaplan’s reporting, which suggests a growing lack of trust on the part of junior officers toward senior officers, points to a failure of what Sun Tzu calls sincerity.  Because they cannot be assured of their futures in the military, talented junior officers, Kaplan says, are opting out:

West Point
cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after
graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them
decide not to sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998
faced that decision, only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11
were still vivid; the war in Afghanistan seemed a success; and war in
Iraq was under way. Duty called, and it seemed a good time to be an
Army officer. But last year, when the 905 officers from the class of
2001 had to make their choice to stay or leave, 44 percent quit the
Army. It was the service’s highest loss rate in three decades.

       This situation might reflect the failure of senior officers, the generals, to listen to and learn from the experiences of the junior officers.  Instead of adapting themselves to evolving circumstances, they are forcing the juniors to conform to their wishes, which pushes against this advice from Sun Tzu:

Therefore, a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates. (5.21)

     To which the commentator Ch’en Hao adds:

Experts in war depend especially on opportunity and expediency.  They do not place the burden of accomplishment on their men alone.

         And just in case we have missed this important point, Sun Tzu reminds us again:

He [the general] changes his methods and alters his plans so that people have no knowledge of what he is doing. (11.45)

     That seems to be the underlying problem: the generals are just out of touch and too slow to change.  Maybe they should get back to reading their copies of Sun Tzu!