Simon sent me this link and asked for my comment.  In today’s Asia Times, Andrei Lankov asks if there is any realistic possibility for countries of East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam), which share a tenuous connection to "Confucian culture," to come together into an EU-like union.  He then knocks down this very possibility, which I think is probably the right impulse, but for the wrong reasons.

     Lankov plays down the role of nationalism in keeping EA states apart.  He suggests that European nationalism of 70 years ago (pre-WWII) was more virulent than contemporary East Asian nationalisms but that Europe overcame these differences to come together.  If Europe could overcome its nationalisms, why can’t EA overcome its?  Well, of course, the key point here, unmentioned by Lankov, is how Europe overcame its nationalisms.  It was only after the full and awful development of the most virulent and destructive nationalism, and an extensive total war to combat it, and the deep national trauma of war (for France and Britain) and defeat (for Germany and Italy), and painful recovery with the recognition of the futility of the earlier nationalism, and the fear of a greater threat (the Soviet Union), that Europe overcame its nationalisms to create a union.  None of these conditions now obtains in East Asia, and let’s hope they do not arise in the near future.

    EA nationalisms are not as "bad" as pre-war European nationalisms (especially in its fascist expression), nor are they easily "solved" in the present.  Indeed, I think nationalism is the key element in keeping EA from forming a EU-like union.

    A second point Lankov makes is more plausible.  EA unity is difficult to foresee, and unlike Europe, because of the imbalance in economic and political scale between China and the others.  In Europe, France, Germany, Britain and Italy are all in the same political-economic league.  In EA, China is the 800 pound gorilla.  This mismatch between potential union partners creates some wariness among the smaller powers (and, I would add, fuels nationalism all around) and will keep them at arms length from China.  I think this is correct.

    I would add a third point: all of the key players in EA are very much reliant on access to US markets and capital, so much so that turning inward to create an EU-like organization is economically irrelevant.  What matters most is China’s connections to the US; same for Japan.  Now, that might change over time (inter-regional trade and connections are increasing) but, right now, neither China nor Japan (nor the others) would want to risk any sort of disruption in their economic relations with the US to make a decisive step toward EU-ness.

    Let me make a final comment (you asked for it Simon!) about what all this suggests for the relationship between culture and political economy.  It is true that the four countries Lankov mentions have certain historical ties to a common "Confucian" culture (we will put aside for now how "Confucian," as opposed to "Legalist," that heritage really is).  But those potential cultural commonalities are insufficient to propel political-economic union.  At the level of the state (as opposed to the level of the individual), quite the opposite is true: political and economic forces shape the interpretation and use of "culture."  Culture, in this sense, is not autonomous from, and determinate of, political economy; rather, political economy, while not wholly divorced from its cultural context, has a greater influence in defining the flow and form of culture than vice versa.

    Back to you, Simon.