The Washington Post has a worrisome editorial today, entitled: Iraq Slips Away.  The writers point out the political conditions in that war-torn country are not supportive of unified constitutional rule.  The Kurds have established a "statelet" in the north and are carefully protecting their autonomy; the Shia are following suit with calls for their own region in the south; and Sunnis in the central part of the country seem shut out of the emerging new order.  Without an underlying political accomodation, the new constitution, if passed, may simply accelerate the move toward larger-scale civil war.

     The Post suggests that what is needed is clearer leadership on the part of President Bush and other American leaders. While better US leadership would be nice, it is insufficient to salavage the situtaion in Iraq.

     Most critiques of the US war have focused on the incompetence of American policy: not enough troops on the ground; wrong-headed de-Baathification; over-reliance on a small group of ex-patriates for intelligence, etc.  The suggestion here is that the goal of a unified, US-friendly, democratic Iraq could have been achieved, but it has been mishandled by Bush and Co.

      There is another possibility here, however: that the US never had the capacity, however competent its political leadership, to get what it wanted in Iraq.  "Regime change" is not a simple, military operation, relying merely on toppling the old ruler and then watching as precisely the kind of government you want springs up in its stead.  No, "regime change" is an extremely complex political process that cannot be engineered from the outside by military power.  It can only be managed from within; that is why Kurds and Shia are steering the process in ways that contradict American goals: they are inside the political culture and dynamic; the US is outside.

    So, the US never had the capacity to to manage regime change in a way that would serve its interests.  If the goal was a "democratic Iraq" that would set an example for a "big bang" of democratization across the region, then the US never had the means of reliably delivering the goods.  What Iraq may come to symbolize for others is the likelihood of national disintegration and civil war.  Although there are certain liberal aspects of Kurdistan that might serve the neo-conservative project of a regional democratic demostration effect, those positive elements could well be overwhelmed by whatever happens in Kirkuk, where it looks like Kurds are quite willing to spark a war.  And the probable Islamic Republic of the Shia south looks much more of a gain for Iran than the US.

    In short, the Bush administration was, from the outset, blind to the limitations of American power.  To take it a step further, they were blind to what is possible to achieve in foreign policy or, most generally, in politics.  They thought they could "do something" for the better.  At this point it looks like they should have realized that to "do nothing," or to "do less," would have brought them to the same point at less cost.

    Yes, I am flirting with a Taoist idea here (more on that in a minute).  Think about it: if the US had not invaded, Saddam would still be in power, but in declining power.  He was obviously weaker, due to over a decade of sanctions and "no-fly zones," than we realized.  His army would not fight for him, which we should have known.  He had no operational WMD capability and no operational relationship with al-Qaeda.  So, if we had "done nothing" in spring 2003, we would have had been faced with maintaining "smart sanctions," to take the burden of suffering off of Iraqi people, while keeping pressure on the Saddam regime.  The "cost" to all of this would have been the continuation of a brutal regime.  Yet things have gone so badly in Iraq since the invasion that it is getting harder to argue that, for the average Iraqi, life is better now than before.  Would it have been better to "do nothing" than "do something?"

    If we had "done less" in 2003, then perhaps we would have just gone in, taken down Saddam and then left immediately.  This would have opened the door to a tumultuous political situation, as different groups violently vied for power.  But that is what we have gotten in any event!  While there may still be a shred of reasoning to support the initial invasion (though I personally don’t buy it), there now appears to be no real grounds for arguing that maintaining US troops in Iraq for 2.5 years and counting has been better than "doing less" (i.e. pulling out US troops very much earlier).

    So, "doing nothing" might have been better; and "doing less" almost certainly would not have been worse, than "doing something."  It seems, then, that this passage from the Tao Te Ching might turn out to have been wise counsel for US policy-makers:

If you use the Way to help a ruler of people
you never use weapons to coerce all beneath heaven.
Such things always turn against you:

fields where soldiers camp
turn to thorn and bramble,
and vast armies on the march
leave years of misery behind.

The noble prevail if they must, then stop:
they never press on to coerce the world.

Prevail, but never presume.
Prevail, but never boast.
Prevail, but never exult.
Prevail, but never when there’s another way.
This is to prevail without coercing.

Things grown strong soon grow old.
This is called losing the Way:
Lose the Way and you die young. (30)