A change of pace: a piece from the Philadelphia Inquirer, March 13, 2005.  As you can see, this article built off of the previous LA Times op-ed, but integrates the Anti-Succession Law and the US-Japan announcement.  Am I too pessimistic?

     "If you want peace, prepare for war,"
goes the old Roman saying, and on the question of Taiwan, both China
and the United States are following that advice. But strategic
conditions in East Asia could make war more likely.

     Tensions are rising primarily because Taiwan’s political
transformation is moving it away from mainland China. In the last two
decades, the island nation has remade itself from an authoritarian
state, dominated by the Nationalist Party, into a vibrant multiparty
democracy. In 2000, executive power was peacefully transferred through
free and fair elections to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Chen
Shui-bian, the DPP president, won reelection last March – though not
without controversy and a protracted recount – while in December the
Nationalist Party held on to its parliamentary majority in competitive
legislative elections. Freedom of the press is exercised and civil
liberties are protected. By any measure of democratization, Taiwan is
an admirable success.

     Taiwan’s triumph, however, is China’s embarrassment. Although
economic and social change has swept across China, its political system
remains an anachronistic communist dictatorship that crushes dissent
and controls the media.

     The growing contrast between dictatorial China and democratic Taiwan
is more than just a matter of political form. It is an element of
national identity. Although important facets of Taiwanese culture –
ancestry, language, cuisine – are Chinese, many people in Taiwan now
see themselves as a distinct country, a free nation that has grown away
from China. They are Taiwanese, not Chinese.

     Since democratization began, the "return to the mainland" myth has
further receded. The democratic political life shared by millions of
Taiwanese is forging a common civic identity, and it cannot be
dismissed as an invention of those who want to publicly declare
independence.

     Nowhere is this more evident than in the notion of the "status quo."
For mainland China and the United States, it refers to the "one China"
principle, a reflection of the politics of the 1970s – before democracy
took root in Taiwan. For many Taiwanese, perhaps most, it has come to
mean the situation that has actually prevailed since 1986, an empirical
independence that allows them to rule themselves without Chinese
control.

     The Democratic Progressive Party has given political voice to this
national aspiration and even the Nationalist Party, which for many
years has accepted the idea that Taiwan is a part of China, has had to
change its rhetoric to attract votes for the growing number of
self-identified Taiwanese.

     China, of course, rejects any hint of separation and doggedly holds
on to the "one China" ideal. Even though the Communist Party has never
administratively controlled the island, it claims sovereignty over
Taiwan and has long threatened the use of force should Taiwan formally
declare independence. When the Nationalists ruled Taiwan, there was
little possibility of such a declaration; but more recently the DPP
leadership has flirted with actions and announcements that come
perilously close to formal independence.

     Realizing that Taiwan is slipping away, China has now upped the
ante. On Tuesday, an anti-secession law was introduced in China’s
pliant legislature. The measure, which will certainly be enacted,
authorizes "nonpeaceful means" to counter any move by Taiwan toward
independence or secession. Previously, China would not renounce the use
of force in contemplating a complete Taiwan breakaway; now it is
positively committed to military action in a wider array of scenarios.
The bill calls for a coercive response not just in the case of a formal
declaration of Taiwan independence, but also in the event that "major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that
possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely
exhausted."

     Conceivable interpretations of that include a declaration by Beijing
that a large-scale public demonstration favorable to Taiwan
independence, such as voting for DPP candidates, is justification for
attack. The clause is open-ended enough that China might simply
conclude that Taiwan is no longer committed to reunification and invoke
the new legislation.

     Beijing is also working hard to develop the military tools that
would be necessary to invade or significantly damage Taiwan. Although
the numbers are murky, Western analysts believe that China is building
up its naval forces, its amphibious assault capability, and its
ballistic missile threat.

     The hardening of China’s policy toward Taiwan has not gone unnoticed
in Washington and Tokyo. On Feb. 18 the United States and Japan
announced that security in the area around Taiwan is their "common
strategic objective." Stripped of its diplomatic understatement, this
new policy suggests that Japan, which had previously taken a more
neutral position on the Taiwan question, would support a U.S.
counterattack against a Chinese assault on the island. The
long-standing U.S. commitment to militarily support Taiwan, as
evidenced in the Taiwan Relations Act and in American actions over the
years, is now bolstered by the addition of Japan.

     It is, therefore, a dangerous time; one that calls for careful
diplomacy and shrewd policy. China and Taiwan are growing apart. China
is prescribing military action for a greater number of contingencies.
The United States and Japan are committing themselves to defend Taiwan.
Perhaps nobody wants war but, then again, who really wanted war in
Europe in 1914?